Fund managers have incentives to inflate their quarterly performance through last-minute purchases of stocks they already own. This study identifies two distinct changes in the market environment that reduced those incentives, increased regulatory attention in late 2000 and improved market liquidity following the implementation of Regulation NMS in 2007. Greater attention by regulators raises the likelihood of getting caught, while improved liquidity reduces the price impact of last-minute purchases. Once regulators paid attention to portfolio pumping, the magnitude of last-minute price spikes in mutual fund holdings and in institutional trading around quarter-ends declined; those declines are largest around year-ends. After the implementation of Reg NMS, last-minute price spikes in fund holdings largely disappeared, and institutional trading at quarter-ends declined even further. While Ben-David et al. (2013) and recent SEC actions indicate that some hedge funds still inflate their holdings, the results in this study suggest that regulatory scrutiny and faster markets greatly reduced portfolio pumping among U.S. mutual funds. JEL Classifications: G18, G23, G28, K22
I. Introduction
"When does finance help ordinary people and when does it take advantage of them?" asks Luigi Zingales in his 2015 Presidential Address to the American Finance Association. "To separate the wheat from the chaff, we need to identify the rent-seeking components of finance, that is, those activities that while profitable from an individual point of view are not so from a societal point of view." (Zingales, 2015 (Zingales, , 1343 . One activity that fits Zingales' description of rent-seeking is portfolio pumping: By aggressively purchasing additional stocks during the last minutes of the trading quarter, fund managers can temporarily drive up stock prices, disclose inflated portfolio values, and report misleadingly high fund returns. Managers have incentives to do this because better-performing managers attract more investors and receive larger bonuses (Bhattacharyya and Nanda, 2013) .
Allegations of deliberate price manipulations around quarter-ends date back decades (Zweig, 1997) , and Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed (2002) argue that the practice is rampant during the mid-1980s and 1990s : CKMR document quarter-end reversals for aggregate mutual fund indices, for individual fund values, and for stocks held by mutual funds. Subsequent studies find similar results for mutual funds in Australia (Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan, 2009), in South Korea (Lee, Baek, and Park, 2014) , in China (Shackleton, Yan, and Yao, 2017) and for hedge funds (Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014; Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi, 2013) . Reversals are more pronounced at year-ends and for funds with greater incentives to temporarily boost their portfolio values. Yet these studies do not examine actual trades of mutual fund managers.
The first paper to examine aggregate daily trading of large institutional investors covered by Ancerno between 1999 and 2010 is Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang (2014) . If mutual fund managers drive up stock prices at the end of reporting periods, the spikes in their holdings should be caused by spikes in last-minute stock purchases at quarter-ends, and by even more pronounced surges in last-minute purchases at year-ends. Yet Hu et al. (2014) find that aggregate daily purchases of Ancerno's clients stay the same at quarter-ends and actually decline at year-ends. Institutional investors are also reluctant to sell stocks at quarter-ends, presumably to avoid downward price pressure on their holdings. Hu et al. (2014) point out that this reduction in liquidity can amplify the price impact of last-minute purchases by other market participants. Large institutional investors might contribute to price spikes in fund holdings not through last-minute purchases, but through depressed selling.
In this study, we identify two distinct events that reduce managers' incentives to engage in portfolio pumping. We hypothesize that these events reduce the magnitude of quarter-end price spikes in aggregate mutual fund indices, individual fund values, and fund holdings as well as last-minute purchases by institutional investors. The first event is increased regulatory attention after the release of CKMR's study in late 2000, and the second is the implementation of Reg NMS in 2007. We expect that both events decrease those incentives, albeit through different mechanisms: Heightened regulatory attention reduces pumping incentives by raising the likelihood of getting caught and fined, while improved market quality reduces incentives since it lowers the expected price impact of last-minute trading. Consequently, we examine the three different periods that surround these two events. The initial period cor-responds to CKMR's sample and extends until the third quarter of 2000, the middle period captures the increased regulatory attention that resulted from CKMR's release ( 2000Q4 -2007) , and the last period reflects the full implementation of Reg NMS (2008 -2011) .
During the initial period, when portfolio pumping evades regulatory attention, we find price spikes in daily Lipper mutual fund indices that mirror those reported by CKMR. These spikes are pronounced among small cap growth funds, which increase, on average, by 0.84% at quarter-ends, and by 1.76% at year-ends. Aggregate institutional trading imbalances also indicate last-minute spikes during the early period: Abnormal institutional stock purchases are 92.78% higher in the last thirty minutes of trading in 1999, and are 57% higher, on average, at other quarter-ends in 1999 and 2000. While institutional trading records indicate intraday surges in abnormal buying prior to increased regulatory attention, this finding needs to be interpreted cautiously because Ancerno's time stamps are frequently inaccurate. Yet taken together, data from a variety of different sources suggest that last-minute purchases by mutual fund managers are a likely cause for the widespread end-of-quarter price spikes in mutual fund NAVs before regulatory attention increased in late 2000.
Between the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2007, none of the Lipper indices spike at year-end, but evidence of price spikes at other quarter-ends does not completely vanish: Abnormal institutional buying decreased from 57% to 12%, and quarter-end spikes in the small-cap growth index dropped from 0.84% to 0.55%. Once Reg NMS increases competition and improves market quality in 2007, we show that Lipper indices no longer spike and that abnormal institutional buying is negative at quarter-ends.
Our study provides several insights. First, it identifies two events that reduce managers' incentives to inflate their quarterly holdings, increased attention by regulators from late 2000 onward, and improved market liquidity following the implementation of Regulation NMS in 2007. Greater regulatory attention increases the likelihood of fines and reputational demage, thereby raising the cost of pumping. Improved liquidity reduces the price impact of lastminute purchases, and hence, lowers the benefits from pumping. Second, it shows that the magnitudes of last-minute spikes in mutual fund values, in fund holdings, and in institutional trading decline once regulators watch out for portfolio pumping. Declines around year-ends are larger than around quarter-ends. Third, last-minute spikes largely disappear after the implementation of Regulation NMS. Regulatory scrutiny and faster markets appear to have drastically decreased fund managers' portfolio pumping since the turn of the millennium.
This finding contributes to a growing literature that examines the impact of regulatory attention in financial markets. Christie, Harris, and Schultz (1994) record a sharp increase in Nasdaq dealers' use of odd-eighth quotes once the Justice Department had confirmed its investigation into possible antitrust violations; Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) show that the SEC is more likely to investigate firms located closer to its offices; Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) document that opportunistic insiders reduce their trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement; and Del Guercio, Odders-White, and Ready (2017) link insider trading enforcement to SEC budgets. We use the release of CKMR's study as an instrument and document that increased regulatory enforcement of portfolio pumping sharply reduced last-minute abnormal institutional purchases and price spikes in mutual fund NAVs.
Regulatory attention is not the only reason why systematic evidence of portfolio pumping has disappeared among U.S. mutual funds. Improved market liquidity following the implementation of Reg NMS in 2007 seems to further reduce the price impact of last-minute stock purchases. Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011, 2015) document that the traditional measures of market quality, such as execution speed, bid-ask spreads, and transactions costs, all improve dramatically due to the growth in electronic trading. Hendershott and Moulton (2011) show that implementing the NYSE's Hybrid Market, with increasing automation and fast trading, made prices more efficient. Conversely, Chung and Chuwonganant (2012) claim that Reg NMS has proven to be detrimental to most traders. We are not aware of any other study that examines the effect of Reg NMS on incentives to engage in illicit trading behavior.
II. Research Design
Economic theory makes several crisp predictions about the costs and benefits of portfolio pumping, the differences in fund managers' ability to temporarily inflate quarter-end closing prices, and the timing of their trades (Bhattacharyya and Nanda, 2013; Bernhardt and Davies, 2009; Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Khorana, 1996 Khorana, , 2001 :
Fund managers benefit from inflated holdings because disclosing better performance can lead to larger inflows, higher bonuses, and greater job security for them; incentives are higher for active managers of better-performing funds (because of the convex flow-performance relation) and of younger funds (since establishing a positive track record is particularly lucrative); managers who invest in small, illiquid stocks have more opportunities to generate a sizeable price impact; stock purchases during the last minutes of the disclosure period have the highest price impact; expected costs of portfolio pumping are a function of the likelihood that pumping will get detected and the expected cost due to legal penalties (i.e., injunctive relief, disgorgement of illicit profits, civil lawsuits) and reputational damage.
Despite these detailed theoretical predictions, studying portfolio pumping empirically is challenging because individuals engaged in illicit activities typically hide their trails. As Jacob and Levitt (2003, 871) note:
"The intellectual exercise associated with uncovering [...] misdeeds differs substantially from the typical economic application in which the research starts with a well-defined measure of the outcome variable (e.g., earnings, economic growth, profits) and then attempts to uncover the determinates of these outcomes. In the case of corruption, there is typically no clear outcome variable, making it necessary for the research to employ nonstandard approaches in generating such a measure."
Since fund managers' motives for trading and their actual trades are unobservable, most studies infer portfolio pumping indirectly from price and volume spikes. CKMR document that these price spikes are widespread, affect aggregate mutual fund indices, and vary crosssectionally with managers' incentives and opportunities to inflate reported quarterly returns.
An obvious concern is that the documented quarter-end spikes are not actually caused by illicit last-minute trading. The literature advances window dressing and depressed selling as alternative explanations. Sias and Starks (1997) , Musto (1997 Musto ( , 1999 , He, Ng, and Wang (2004) , Sias (2007) , Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014) , and others document that some managers buy outperforming stocks and sell underperforming stocks prior to quarterly reporting dates to appear as if they held winning stocks throughout the quarter. It is conceivable that quarter-end price and volume spikes in stocks that performed well during the quarter are unintended consequences of this window dressing by underperforming fund managers and not due to deliberate price manipulations by fund managers who already own these stocks. 1
HMPW attribute year-end price spikes to depressed selling. Their analysis of daily institutional trading imbalances shows no significant difference between typical days and quarterend days. On the last day of the year, institutions actually buy and sell fewer stocks. At first glance, HMPW's results contradict CKMR's assertion that mutual fund managers temporarily inflate year-end prices through excess buying. However, three caveats are in order:
First, the sample period between the two different studies barely overlaps. Second, due to noisy Ancerno time stamps, HMPW examine aggregate trading at daily frequencies, while theory predicts that pumping occurs primarily in the last minutes of the quarter among funds with specific incentives to inflate closing prices. Third, Ancerno aggregates trades by fund family and anonymizes family identities so that researchers cannot link institutional trading to managers' incentives.
In this study, we hypothesize that two events reduce managers' incentives to engage in portfolio pumping. By investigating variations in incentives over time, we mitigate the limitation of Ancerno's anonymized, aggregate data, which prevent researchers from linking fund managers' trades to their incentives cross-sectionally. We also develop a fund-level measure of pumping that only considers price spikes during the last thirty minutes of the quarter, and price reversals during the subsequent thirty minutes of the next trading quarter.
Similarly, we only attribute excess buying by institutions during the last thirty minutes of the trading quarter to portfolio pumping; it is highly unlikely that window dressers delay their stock purchases until the waning minutes of the trading quarter. While CKMR provide evidence of widespread portfolio pumping in the United States, 2 Mark Hulbert of MarketWatch points out: "To the extent that lower-ranked funds engage in window dressing, they will spread their cosmetic purchases out over several trading sessions rather than wait to the very last minute, when it is almost guaranteed that they will receive very poor executions on their trades." See Only their managers know for sure, MarketWatch, 10/6/2004, www.marketwatch.com/ story/illegal- , 2000) and agrees on June 20, 2000 to pay C$3.08 million in fines.
Nine employees were suspended from trading, some of them for life (OSC, 2000a) .
A few months later portfolio pumping receives attention from regulators in the United
States. Paul Roye, director of the SEC's Investment Management Division, mentions on
October 12, 2000 that the SEC had established a task force to study portfolio pumping (McCarty, 2000) . The SEC announces on November 27, 2000 that it "has requested trading records from some mutual fund companies as part of a task force investigation into the possibility that funds are engaging in the practice" (Hansard, 2000) . Once the SEC steps up its enforcement efforts against portfolio pumping, the exchanges enhance their trading surveillance systems of orders entered during the closing period (Markham, 2014) . Nasdaq implements closing price auctions in November of 2004 to improve price discovery at closing. Fund companies also tighten their internal controls and implement Compliance Trade Oversight Programs to prevent illicit activities like portfolio pumping. For example, ABN AMRO now requires that a supervisor reviews and approves large orders received for execution in the final thirty minutes of trading. Similarly, Oechsle requires that all equity trades be initiated and monitored by the trading department, and not by portfolio managers. Oechsle also hired additional compliance and trading personnel, upgraded its trading system, and strengthened its compliance program (SEC, 2001a) . All these actions deter price inflation through last-minute trading.
Event 2: Implementation of Reg NMS
The second event occurs with the implementation of Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) in 2007. As two SEC Commissioners put it, "[t]he impetus for the Commission's efforts to modernize the securities markets was the outdated Intermarket Trading System ("ITS") trade-through rule that impeded the ability of electronic trading centers to compete against floor-based exchanges in the listed market" (Glassman and Atkins, 2005) . In July of 2007, the industry had to fully comply with Rules 610 and 611 for approximately 250 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq, and the American Stock Exchange.
Rule 611, known as order protection rule or trade-through rule, requires market centers to route orders they receive to other markets that have better prices available. Rule 610, known as access rule, mandates linkages between the markets that enable the routing of orders to other markets in compliance with Rule 611 (SEC, 2005) .
Chester Spatt, the SEC's Chief Economist from [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , told the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises on February 28, 2014:
"In the aftermath of Regulation NMS there is much faster execution due to the preference NMS provided to 'fast markets' as well as greater competition among platforms and more fragmentation of order activity among platforms, as reflected by the decline in the New York Stock Exchange's share of trading in its own listings from about 80% to 20%. We have seen substantial declines in spreads and trading costs." 4
Automation and trading speed are increasingly important aspects of competition among trading venues. Hendershott and Moulton (2011) use the New York Stock Exchange's introduction of its Hybrid Market to study how increasing automation and speed within a market affect market quality and find that it reduces noise in prices. Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011, 2015) document that traditional measures of market quality, such as execution speed, bid-ask spreads, and transactions costs, all improved dramatically due to the growth in electronic trading. Anand, Hua, and McCormick (2016) find that net effective spreads decline after NYSE Arca expanded make-take pricing in options on November 1, 2012. These findings suggest that automation, improved market quality and increased competition erode the price impact of portfolio pumping, making it difficult for fund managers to inflate stock prices at quarter-ends.
III. Data
We use data from multiple sources. Ancerno (also known as Abel Noser), a company that monitors equity trading costs for institutional investors, provides transaction-level institu- To avoid cross-sectional dependence from regression analysis on the fund share-class level, we aggregate all observations to the fund level by using CRSP portfolio identifiers. 6 Fund level assets are the sum of share-class level assets, while fund level expense and turnover ratios are calculated as value-weighted averages of the share-class level ratios. We restrict our analysis to domestic equity funds, exclude index and sector funds, small funds with assets below $5 million and funds that invest less than 50% of their assets in stocks. We classify funds as Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and Income, or Small Stocks. 5 Hu, Jo, Wang, and Xie (2018) provide an excellent description of the Ancerno database and survey the growing academic literature that uses it. 6 The CRSP portfolio identifiers are available from 2003 onwards. For funds that exit the database prior to 2003, we rely on fund names to aggregate share classes to the fund level.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Excess Returns of Lipper Indices around Quarter-Ends
We hypothesize that quarter-end NAV spikes occur most prominently during times when regulators show little concern about portfolio pumping, that increased regulatory attention reduces these spikes, and that the implementation of Reg NMS further diminishes them.
Our first set of tests replicates and extends CKMR's analysis of daily Lipper indices. These Lipper mutual fund indices correspond to the Morningstar Style Box, a nine-square grid that categorizes equity mutual funds according to the concentration of their stock holdings. One style dimension classifies fund holdings by market capitalization, while the other dimension considers value and growth characteristics.
We follow CKMR by regressing daily fund index returns net of the S&P 500 on six indicator variables:
R i,t denotes the daily excess return of style index i on day t, and Y EN D t equals to one only on the last day of each year, and equals zero otherwise. Similarly, QEN D t denotes the last day of each calendar quarter that is not a year-end, and M EN D t denotes the last day of each month that is not a quarter-end. The variables Y BEG t , QBEG t , and M BEG t are defined analogously, except that they indicate the first day of the period. CKMR document significantly positive coefficients on Y EN D t and QEN D t , significantly negative coefficients on Y BEG t , and QBEG t , and greater economic magnitudes for year-end coefficients compared to quarter-end coefficients.
To investigate whether aggregate return reversals diminish as regulatory attention increases and as Reg NMS mandates faster markets, we examine the three different time periods described previously. The first column of Table I transcribes 
B. Institutional Trading at Quarter-ends
Abnormal institutional buying at quarter-ends should occurs when regulators show little concern about portfolio pumping, this buying should reduce in response to increased regulatory attention, and should further diminish after the full implementation of Reg NMS. To test this hypothesis using Ancerno data, we follow HMPW and calculate daily averages of institution abnormal buying, which is the dollar value of buys on day t minus the average dollar value of buys over days t to t-4, all scaled by the average dollar value of buys over days t to t-4. We regress the daily averages on YEND, a dummy variable indicating the last trading day of the year, QEND, a dummy variable for last trading day of a calendar quarter other than the last, and other controls. We report separate results for the three With that caveat in mind, the top half of Table III shows 
C. Evidence from Cross-sectional NAV Reversals of Mutual Funds
Increased regulatory scrutiny should not affect all mutual funds equally. Evidence of pumping is particularly pronounced for the best-performing mutual funds and for funds that invest in small, less liquid stocks, according to CKMR. As a result, we expect regulators to focus their attention on these funds, and portfolio pumping should therefore decrease more among well-performing and small-cap funds. Unfortunately, we cannot test these cross-sectional hypotheses by analyzing institutional trading imbalances because Ancerno aggregates trades by fund family and anonymizes family identities. Instead, we investigate whether the decrease in quarter-end price reversal is more pronounced for funds that are more likely to invite scrutiny. To examine month, quarter, and year-end changes in NAVs, CKMR use a regression specification with six indicator variables. Bernhardt and Davies (2005) measure fund-level return reversals as the difference between the fund's quarter-end return and its return the following trading day divided by 2. Both approaches attribute the entire price movement over two trading days to portfolio pumping, raising the concern that part of the documented economic effect might be due to window dressing.
We address this worry by developing a conservative measure that focuses only on the thirty minutes surrounding quarter-ends. Specifically, we measure return reversal for fund f at quarter-end q as the difference between the last thirty-minute quarter-end return, r f t,L30 , and the return of the first thirty minutes of the following trading day, r f t+1,F 30 , divided by 2:
For example, if a fund's NAV increased by 65 basis points in the last thirty minutes of the quarter and dropped by 55 basis points in the first thirty minutes the following day, the return reversal measure will yield 60 basis points. A fund's thirty-minute return is calculated as the weighted average of stocks' corresponding thirty-minute returns.
Our multivariate fund-level analysis has three chief advantages. First, it uses a conser- Managers of small-cap funds, which invest in less liquid stocks, have more opportunities to inflate their holdings through last-minute trading. If small-cap funds attract greater regulatory attention, we should see a more pronounced reduction in this investment category.
In Model 2 of Table IV, Fund managers with the best performance have greater incentives to pump their portfolios in order to receive bigger bonuses and to benefit from the convex flow-performance relation (Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; CKMR; Bhattacharyya and Nanda, 2013 -1993-2000 and Top Perf × P- [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . We measure past performance over eleven months and skip the last month of the quarter. The coefficient for the interaction term -1993-2000 in Model 3 shows that intraday quarterly return reversals for top-performing funds were 5.4 basis points higher during the initial period. While return reversals for small-cap funds decreased even faster after the implementation of Reg NMS, the decrease for top performers was no different from other funds.
Several studies debate the role of Active Share, the fraction of all fund holdings that deviate from the fund's benchmark: Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) document that funds with high Active Share outperform their benchmarks and recommend that investors select the most active funds. In contrast, Schlanger, Philips, and LaBarge (2012) and Frazzini, Friedman, and Pomorski (2016) do not find a link between Active Share and fund performance. We investigate whether more active mutual fund managers engage in more portfolio pumping and whether regulatory attention leads to a greater decrease in pumping among more active managers. 7 Our results in Model 4 in Table IV show a positive correlation between Active Share and intraday quarterly return reversals. The interaction effect, however, is insignificantly different from zero.
Overall, Table IV 
D. Stock Return Reversals and Fund Holdings by Time Period
Stocks held by the best-performing mutual funds exhibit greater return reversals than stocks matched on size and recent performance, according to CKMR. They conclude: "Because we observe this abnormal performance in the specific holdings of top equity mutual funds, the evidence strongly suggests marking-up activity by mutual fund managers" (CKMR, 688).
If regulatory attention discourages fund managers from inflating their holdings after 2000, and Reg NMS further limits their ability to mark up closing prices after 2007, we expect the relation between mutual fund holdings and stock-level return reversals to weaken in response.
In this section we test that prediction.
CKMR measure return reversals as last day's stock return minus next day's stock return to capture both the initial rise and the subsequent fall caused by end-of-period marking up.
To be conservative, we only consider intraday price movements within thirty minutes of the quarter-end to calculate return reversals. The dependent variable for our models in Table V is therefore [r t − r t+1 )]/2, where r t is the return for last thirty minutes of the quarter and r t+1 is the return for the first thirty minutes of the next trading quarter.
To investigate whether the link between stock-level return reversals and mutual fund holdings weakens in response to increased regulatory attention and, even further, after the implementation of Reg NMS, we include Fund Hold, the fraction of outstanding shares held by all mutual funds disclosed in 13f filings, and also interact it with the two indicator variables that denote the first and last period of our sample. Following CKMR we control for size and past performance: The variable size is the stock's market capitalization in billion dollars, and quarterly return denotes the stock return until the penultimate day of the quarter.
In addition, liquidity and volatility might also impact the magnitude of stock-level return reversals. Our four liquidity measures include Non S&P500, indicating that the stock is not part of the S&P 500 index, an indicator if the stock is traded on the Nasdaq stock exchange, the number of market makers and the average daily volume, which is normalized by total shares outstanding. We measure volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns in percent, which is calculated by excluding the five days surrounding the quarter-end, and also include industry and quarter dummies in our regression specification. (SEC, 2005) . Consistent with that objective, Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011, 2015) find that the rise in electronic trading increases liquidity, which reduces the price impact of trades.
After Reg NMS, marking up stock prices requires larger last-minute buy orders, which increases direct trading costs, distorts optimal portfolio balances, and attracts attention from compliance officers, stock exchanges, and regulators. Bollen and Pool (2009), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) , and Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi (2013) find that hedge funds manipulate their period-end returns.
This raises the possibility that institutional investors other than mutual funds drive our results. To investigate this concern, we replace mutual fund holdings with other institutional holdings, again obtained from 13f filings. Similar to our results for mutual fund holdings, Model 2 shows that the interaction term, P-1993-2000 × Other Inst. Hold, is also positive and significant, while the other interaction term, P-2008-2011 × Other Inst. Hold, is negative and significant.
In Model 3, we include mutual fund holdings and other institutional holdings, and interact both variables with indicators that denote the first and last period of our sample. All interaction terms maintain their economic and statistical significance, suggesting that regulatory attention and faster markets reduced the price impact of portfolio pumping among mutual funds as well as among other institutional investors. Across all three specifications the coefficients on the control variables show that return reversals are more pronounced for stocks that are not part of the S&P 500, stocks that are traded on Nasdaq, smaller stocks, more volatile stocks, and stocks with fewer market makers.
CKMR are first in linking the magnitude of stock-level return reversals to the fraction of shares held by mutual funds. We confirm their findings with a conservative measure of stock return reversals and advance their results by showing that subsequent regulatory scrutiny and Reg NMS significantly weakened the relation between fund holdings and return reversals.
E. Stock Trading Volume at Period-End Days
In this section, we investigate intraday stock trading volume at period-ends and examine Next, we examine inter-temporal buying volumes of funds in Ancerno data on period-end days. The dependent variable is abnormal buying, which is the dollar values of buys on the last day of each quarter scaled by the average daily dollar value over the quarter. Results are reported in Table VI . Results in Models 1 through Model 3 confirm our earlier findings in Table III : portfolio pumping was significantly higher in the initial period, P-1993-2000 , and further decreased after the the implementation of Reg NMS, P-2008-2011 . In Model 3, the coefficient for Year End is negative and significant, indicating that over the entire sample, abnormal buying is less in year-end days compared to quarter-end days.
Because Ancerno anonymizes its data, fund characteristics are unobservable. We do, however, include the rank of a fund's quarterly dollar trading volume and the number of funds in the fund family in our analysis. The significantly positive coefficient in Model 1 on quarterly dollar trading volume, Quintile $ Volume, is consistent with our earlier results in Table IV that portfolio pumping is more pronounced for funds with larger size and higher turnover. Model 2 shows that funds in large families exhibit more pumping behavior, presumably because larger fund families have more funds and probably face more competition.
Overall, the patterns of trading volume at quarter-ends at fund level provide further evidence that regulatory attention deterred some funds from pumping, and that Reg NMS further reduced pumping incentives.
V. Conclusion
Managers of active equity mutual funds hold over $12.5 trillion in assets (ICI, 2018, 249) .
The incentives they face and the actions they take affect the financial security of millions.
It is therefore disconcerting that fund managers can benefit from driving up the values of their existing holdings by purchasing additional stocks at quarter-ends. This practice, known as portfolio pumping, allows them to disclose misleadingly high returns to attract additional investors, and ultimately, higher fees. Researchers, investors and regulators need
to thoroughly understand what circumstances mitigate or exacerbate portfolio pumping if they want to keep this manipulative rent seeking behavior at bay.
In this study, we hypothesize that two events reduce managers' incentives to engage in portfolio pumping. Greater regulatory attention after the release of CKMR's study in late 2000 raises expected costs of last-minute price inflation, and the implementation of Reg NMS in 2007 lowers the expected price impact of last-minute trading. CKMR and HMPW mostly analyze aggregate daily returns and trading. We construct institution-specific intraday measures of portfolio pumping for mutual funds, large institutional traders, and stocks held by mutual funds and use these measures to investigate how fund managers respond to increased regulatory attention and to Reg NMS.
We document significant time-series variation in the pervasiveness of portfolio pumping.
Prior to the release of CKMR, we find comprehensive evidence of portfolio pumping. All nine daily Lipper mutual fund indices increase significantly at year-ends, and all execept the large cap value index increase at quarter-ends. For example, small cap indices increase between Imagine an accident-prone intersection where some motorists run red lights. Installing traffic cameras reduces red-light violations, but does not eliminate them; replacing the traffic signal with a roundabout does. It appears that something similar happened to portfolio pumping in the United States: The initial regulatory response to CKMR's study was increased enforcement, which reduced portfolio pumping, but did not eliminate it; faster markets in the wake of Regulation NMS did. In his 2015 Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, Luigi Zingales encourages a greater emphasis on "improprieties in the financial industry," noting that "our primary contribution as researchers is to expose . . . distortions, to act as whistleblowers" (Zingales, 2015) . Our study provides evidence that CKMR were right in blowing the whistle on portfolio pumping, and that regulators listened. Carhart et al. (2002) , which is for the period of 14/7/ 1992 -7/7/2000 . Columns 1992 -2000 , 2001 -2007 , and 2008 report results for the period from 14/7/1992 to the end of the third quarter of 2000, from the fourth quarter of 2000 to 2007, and from 2008 to 2011, respectively. We group the indices into Small Cap, Mid Cap, and Large Cap and use ** and * to denote statistical significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent level, respectively. CKMR 1992 CKMR -2000 CKMR 2001 CKMR -2007 CKMR 2008 CKMR -2011 
Small Cap
Evidence of Portfolio Pumping in Institutional Trading
The dependent variable is the daily equal-weighted average of abnormal buying across institutions in the sample. Following HMPW, abnormal buying is calculated for each institution on each day as the dollar value of buys on day t minus the average dollar value of buys over days t to t-4, all scaled by the average dollar value of buys over days t to t-4. The control variables are the CRSP value-weighted market return for each of the five previous days (R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5), the volatility of this return, which is measured as the return squared, for each of the five previous days (V1, V2, V3, V4, and V5), dummy variables indicating the day of the week (MON, TUE, THUR, FRI), the previous five days' ratios (L-RATIO1 to L-RATIO5), dummy variables for the first five days of the month (NEWM5), the first five days of the quarter (NEWQ5), the first five days of the year (NEWY5), and finally the last day of the month that is non-quarter-end (MEND). YEND is a dummy variable indicating the last trading day of the year and QEND is a dummy variable for the last trading day of a calendar quarter other than the last. Columns 1999-2000, 2001-2007, and 2008-2010 This table reports intra-day 30-minute intervals coefficients and p-values for regressions of two institutional tradings measures, Abnormal Buy and Abnormal Sell, on QEND (last trading day of a calendar quarter other than the last), YEND (last trading day of the the year) for three subperiods: 1993 to the end of the third quarter of 2000 (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , the fourth quarter of 2000 to 2007 (2001-2007) , and from 2008 to 2011 (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . Abnormal Buy and Abnormal Sell are calculated for funds at 30-minute interval. More specifically, for each fund, Abnormal Buy (Sell) for time interval T of day t is the dollar value of buys (sells) in time interval T on day t scaled by the average dollar value of buys (sells) for the same time period T over all days in quarter with day t. Standard errors are robust and intercepts are included in the regressions but not reported for brevity. -1993-2000) and from 2008 to 2011 (P-2008-2011) , an indicator variable for funds in the top quintile of style-adjusted, relative past performance (Top Perf), Active Share measure and interaction terms between them. ln(Fund Size) is the natural logarithm of fund size; Expenses is the quarterly expense ratio in percentage; Turnover is the quarterly portfolio turnover in percentage; Fund Age is the fund age in months; Aggressive Growth, Growth, and Small are indicator variables denote fund's style. The sample period is from 1993 to 2011 for Model 1-3 and is from 1993 to 2006 for Model 4 since Active Share measures are only available until 2006. Robust standard errors are clustered by funds and provided in brackets. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is 30-minute around quarter-end return reversals, a measure of price pressure for the period from 1993 to 2011. Fund Hold (Other Inst Hold) are the fraction of shares outstanding held by all actively managed mutual funds (other 13-F filing institutions other than mutual funds). P-1993-2000 and P-2008-2011 are indicator variables for all quarters from 1993 to the third quarter of 2000 and from 2008 to 2011, respectively. Non S&P500 is an indicator variable which takes value of 1 when a stock is not a constituent of the S&P 500 index. No. Market Maker is the number of market makers for Nasdaq stocks and equals one otherwise; NASDAQ denotes Nasdaq stocks and Size is the stock's market capitalization in billion. Quarterly Return is the return of the quarter excluding the quarter-end day. Average Daily Volume (volume normalized by total shares outstanding) and Std. Dev. Daily Ret.(the standard deviation of daily returns in percents) are calculated excluding the 5 days surrounding the quarter-end. Industry dummies and quarter dummies are included but coefficients are omitted for brevity. Robust standard errors are clustered by funds and provided in brackets. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table VI
Institutional Trading Evidence at the Fund Level
The dependent variable is Abnormal Buy for funds from Ancerno. For each fund, Abnormal Buy of day t is the dollar value of buys on day t scaled by the average dollar value of buys over all days in quarter with day t. P-1993-2000 and P-2008-2011 are indicator variables for all quarters from 1993 to the third quarter of 2000 and from 2008 to 2011, respectively. Quintile $ Volume is the fund's quintile based on its total dollar trading volume in the quarter, which takes value of 5(1) for funds with the largest(smallest) total dollar trading volume. Family Nbr of Funds is the number of funds in the family. Year End is an indicator variable which takes value of 1 when the trading date is the last of the year. Robust standard errors are clustered by funds and provided in brackets. Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
